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Abstract
Nigeria experienced the Global Financial Crisis as a dramatic decline in the price of crude
oil and a burst stock market bubble. These losses were compounded by a high level of
margin lending, resulting in large numbers of nonperforming loans (NPLs) for Nigerian
banks. The government established the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria
(AMCON) in July 2010 to purchase NPLs and inject capital into insolvent banks. AMCON
injected a total of ₦2.3 trillion (US$15.3 billion) in capital into eight different financial
institutions. Five capital injections were designed to bring failing banks to zero net asset
value and allow them to remain open before their acquisition and further recapitalization
by a third-party investor. The three remaining injections were made into purchase-andassumption-style bridge banks, with the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation acting as
receiver. Bridge banks purchased and assumed the assets and liabilities of failed banks
unable to achieve the minimum capital requirement. As a result of its operations, AMCON
accumulated a negative equity position of ₦3.6 trillion (US$24 billion) by the end of 2014.
Observers have highlighted the uncertainty surrounding AMCON’s ability to cover its losses
from funds recovered through the resolution of NPLs, returns on its equity investments,
and the ₦1.5 trillion (US$10 billion) dedicated to its operations through the Banking Sector
Resolution Cost Fund.
Keywords: capital injections, bridge banks, Global Financial Crisis, Nigeria

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based capital-injection programs. Also see the sibling case study in this issue
regarding AMCON’s role as an asset management company. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial
Crises at
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Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria
(AMCON) Capital Injections

At a Glance
During the years leading up to the Global
Financial Crisis, Nigerian banks fueled a
rapid credit expansion to the private
sector. Most notably, banks supplied large
quantities
of
margin
loans
and
investments in the oil and gas sector.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: AMCON was established “to acquire
[NPLs] from [Nigerian] banks and annex the
underlying collateral, [. . .] fill the remaining capital
deficiency and receive equity and/or preferred
shares in the affected banks as consideration”
(Makanjuola 2015)

The situation became unsustainable as the
January 28, 2010
Announcement Date
financial crisis spread around the globe.
(first public hearing
The crash of the domestic stock market in
on the AMCON Act)
March 2008 and the rapid decline of oil
July 19, 2010
and gas prices affected the balance sheets Operational Date
(signed into law)
of many banks in Nigeria, resulting in a
high level of nonperforming loans (NPLs)
Sunset Date
August 5, 2011
in the sector. In response, Nigerian
(injection into
authorities set up the Asset Management
bridge banks)
Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) during
₦2.3 trillion
the summer of 2010. A public corporation, Program Size
(US$15.3 billion)
owned jointly by the Central Bank of
Nigeria (CBN) and the Ministry of Finance,
₦2.3 trillion
AMCON’s mandate was to “acquire [NPLs] Peak Utilization
(US$15.3 billion)
from [Nigerian] banks and annex the
underlying collateral, [as well as] fill the Outcomes
Successful—at great
remaining capital deficiency and receive
cost—at
recapitalizing and
equity and/or preferred shares in the
selling banks
affected banks as consideration.” AMCON
intervened in eight financial institutions,
Created bridge bank
Key Features
injecting a total of ₦2.3 trillion. Five
structure to
injections were made into failing banks
accommodate
that arranged an acquisition by a thirdinstitutions that did
not meet initial
party investor. The remaining three banks
deadline
could not achieve the minimum capital
adequacy ratio (CAR) of 10% required by
the CBN and thus had their assets and liabilities transferred to bridge banks. This approach
was meant to give the authorities time to seek an acquirer. AMCON become the full owner
of these three bridge banks.

499

Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) Capital Injection

Ungersboeck and Runkel

Summary Evaluation
AMCON’s capital injections were successful in protecting depositors and ensuring the
continuation of business in each of the eight banks. Critics have noted issues related to
AMCON’s dependence on CBN guidelines. However, these critics focus on AMCON’s
activities as an asset management company. AMCON’s financial performance has also been
a case for concern. Most of its losses were attributable to its capital injections. Through
loan acquisitions and bank recapitalizations, the agency accumulated a negative equity
position of ₦3.6 trillion by the end of 2014. During the following year, AMCON’s CEO
announced that the corporation had resolved 57% of the acquired loans, recovering a total
of ₦1 trillion. While encouraging, the announcement did not remove the uncertainty
regarding AMCON’s ability to cover losses incurred without requiring further government
support.
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Nigeria Context 2009–2010
GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to
USD)

$291.9 billion in 2009
$361.5 billion in 2010

GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to
USD)

Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior
debt)

Size of banking system

$1,891 in 2009
$2,280 in 2010
Data for 2009:
S&P: B+
Fitch: BB
Moody’s: Not available
Data for 2010:
S&P: B+
Fitch: BB
Moody’s: Not available
$72.2 billion in 2009
$79.0 billion in 2010

Size of banking system as a percentage of
GDP

25% of 2009 GDP
22% of 2010 GDP

Size of banking system as a percentage of
financial system

Data not available in 2009
Data not available in 2010

81.7% in 2009
66.5% in 2010
5.0% in 2009
Foreign involvement in banking system
14.0% in 2010
Data not available in 2009
Government ownership of banking system
Data not available in 2010
Yes, in 2009
Existence of deposit insurance
Up to $3,328 via Nigeria Deposit
Insurance Corporation in 2010
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank
Deposit Insurance Dataset.
Five-bank concentration of banking system
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Overview

Background
In the early 2000s, the Nigerian banking sector underwent major structural reforms. In
2004, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) announced a plan to strengthen the country’s
fragmented financial sector through consolidation (Alford 2010). The CBN justified the
policy with the need to “grow the banks and position them to play pivotal roles in driving
development across the sectors of the economy” (Sanusi 2011). The CBN mandated that all
banks increase their paid-up capital from ₦2 billion (US$13 million) to ₦25 billion (US$166
million).4 The policy was announced just one month after Charles Soludo took office as the
new governor of the CBN in June 2004. Banks had until December 2005, a period of roughly
18 months, to reach the new minimum required capital (Alford 2010). The announcement
forced several mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the banking sector. Of the 89 licensed
privately owned banks active in Nigeria in 2005, 25 emerged. Ultimately, the CBN revoked
the licenses of 13 banks due to their inability to reach the mandated capital level in time
(Osuji 2012).
Following the consolidation, Nigerian banks fueled a rapid credit expansion to the private
sector (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). Banks invested most of the funds in the country’s
natural resources sector and in margin loans for the purchase of domestic stocks, making
them increasingly exposed to oil and stock prices (Cerruti and Neyens 2016; Makanjuola
2016). The expansion of margin lending fueled a five-fold increase in the total
capitalization of the Nigerian stock market between 2004 and 2007 (Osuji 2012;
Makanjuola 2016). The domestic All-Share Index reached its high of 66,162 points on
March 3, 2008, and then fell 70% in the following 12 months (Nigerian Stock Exchange
1996–2021). Oil prices tanked as the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) reduced demand around
the globe. The combined oil and equity price shocks affected the balance sheets of many
banks in Nigeria and led to a rapid increase in nonperforming loans (NPLs) to margin
investors and oil companies (Cerruti and Neyens 2016).
Policymakers became aware of the magnitude of the problems facing the Nigerian financial
sector through a special examination of the banking sector conducted jointly by the Nigeria
Deposit Insurance Company (NDIC) and the CBN in June 2009 (CBN 2010a). The report,
published on August 14, 2009, revealed 10 banks to be either undercapitalized or insolvent
(Alford 2010; Cerruti and Neyens 2016). The report also highlighted the banks’ “excessive
risk-taking and ineffective risk management, weak internal control mechanisms, undue
focus on short-term gains, lack of Board and management capacity, conflicts of interest, and
excessive executive compensation” (Makanjuola 2016). The conclusions of the examination

The exchange rate used throughout—₦150 for US$1—is the average exchange rate between 2009 and 2011,
using annual data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
4
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made clear that several Nigerian banks needed to be recapitalized. The CBN intervened,
quickly and decisively, following the outcome of the examination.
The conclusions resulted in an immediate capital injection totaling ₦420 billion into five
banks—Oceanic Bank, Union Bank Nigeria, Afribank, FinBank, and Intercontinental Bank.
These banks were identified as insolvent and “chronic borrowers at the Expanded Discount
Window (EDW) of the CBN indicating that they had little cash on hand”5 (Alford 2010).
Audits of the remaining five banks were completed by October 3, 2009 (Alford 2010).
Results of the audits are shown in Figure 1. The CBN said it would inject an additional ₦200
billion into Bank PHB, Springbank, Equitorial Trust Bank, and Wema Bank—increasing the
number of intervened banks to nine (CBN 2009). The CBN subsequently lent ₦247 billion to
the four banks (CBN 2010a). CBN removed the managing directors of eight of the nine
banks that received injections—all but Wema Bank, which had just replaced its
management in June 2009 (CBN 2009). A tenth bank, Unity Bank, was also determined to
be insolvent but “had sufficient liquidity to meet its current obligations” and did thus not
receive additional capital (Alford 2010). CBN ordered Wema Bank and Unity Bank to
recapitalize by June 30, 2010 (CBN 2009). By the end of 2009, Equitorial Trust Bank had
repaid its ₦30 billion debt but was still in need of a merger partner. At the end of 2009,
CBN’s outstanding loans to the remaining eight banks stood at ₦637 billion (CBN 2010a).
Figure 1: Overview of CBN Recapitalizations as of December 31, 2009
Bank

Amount [₦ billion]

Intercontinental Bank

100

Union Bank Nigeria

120

Wema Bank

87

Oceanic Bank

100

FinBank

50

Bank PHB

70

Afribank

50

Springbank

60

Total

637

Source: CBN 2010a).

The discount window (DW) is the Central Bank of Nigeria’s lending facility through which it provides
lender-of-last-resort services to Nigerian financial institutions. The DW was expanded in 2008 to accept state
bonds and commercial papers as collateral.
5
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The central bank wrote off these loans in full in 2009 and 2010 but retained them on its
books (CBN 2010a). In 2011, the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) took
over those debts in the course of recapitalizing the banks (CBN 2012).
To ensure continued confidence in the banking sector, the central bank guaranteed all
interbank lending transactions until December 2011 (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). In June
2011, CBN stated that, in order to keep their banking licenses, all intervened banks would
be required to reach the mandated minimum capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of 10% by
September 30, 2011 (Chew and Dijkman 2013).
Program Description
The Nigerian authorities decided to establish a new agency to provide further support to
the banking system. The government decided to establish a new entity because there was
no rapidly available mechanism to inject more public funds into capital deficient banks, and
legal challenges remained regarding the NDIC’s ability to wind up failed banks (Cerruti and
Neyens 2016). The Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria Act was signed into law in
July 2010 by the president, Goodluck Jonathan, officially establishing AMCON as Nigeria’s
public asset management company (AMC). The act mandated AMCON to inject capital and
purchase nonperforming and systemically important loans (Makanjuola 2016).
The AMCON Act stipulated rules on governance and transparency. Regarding governance,
the statute required particular levels of experience and disallowed potential conflicts of
interest. Measures for transparency in operations included the requirement to submit
annual reports to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and CBN and quarterly reports to the
parliament, in addition to publishing annual reports. However, the act did not include
financial safeguards that would limit the government’s exposure to potential losses, as
AMCON’s only shareholder. “There [were] no provisions to limit the amount of assets or
equity that AMCON [could] purchase or the bonds to be issued, no leverage ratio, and no
requirement to maintain a minimum amount of equity” (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). AMCON
was thinly capitalized with paid-in capital of ₦10 billion for asset acquisitions and
recapitalizations totaling more than ₦4 trillion (Cerruti and Neyens 2016).
The CBN launched this recapitalization process for the intervened banks in December
2009, before AMCON had been begun to operate. The CBN’s strategy relied on third-party
investors to acquire failing banks and ensure continued operations. AMCON’s role was to
inject capital into intervened banks in the final stages of the M&A process to facilitate the
deal once a failing bank had signed a transaction implementation agreement (TIA) with an
interested acquirer (Makanjuola 2016). In practice, this was achieved through injections of
zero-coupon bonds with discounted values sufficient to return banks’ net asset values
(NAVs) to zero (Makanjuola 2016).
In addition to the bridge bank solution, the CBN considered three alternatives. Direct
nationalization was thought to be difficult to implement, as it would have required
additional legislation to be enacted. The CBN also opposed liquidation by the NDIC,
motivated by concerns that it would negatively affect the recovering economy. A revocation
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of the banking licenses was opposed for the same reasons as it would have led to forced
liquidation by the NDIC as well (Makanjuola 2016). The bridge bank option was thus
deemed to be the most desirable.
The mergers and acquisitions process that the CBN launched in December 2009 followed a
predetermined series of steps:
(1) Confirmation of interest: Identification of interested investors;
(2) Investor evaluation: Shortlisting of investors and execution of nondisclosure
agreements;
(3) Initial due diligence: Accountants’ reports and interaction with senior management;
(4) Submission of nonbinding offers: Final shortlist of participants and submission of
nonbinding offers;
(5) Final offers: Detailed due diligence and reception of final offers;
(6) Evaluate bids: Review and evaluation of final offers and follow-up discussion;
(7) Discussion and recommendation of bids: Discussion of course of action and
finalizing of decision on preferred investor;
(8) Entering into exclusive negotiations: Exclusive negotiations with the preferred
investor and finalization of a memorandum of understanding (MOU); and
(9) Approval and AMCON capital injection: Signing of TIA and securing all necessary
approvals, then AMCON capital injection (Makanjuola 2016).
The new management teams and boards of undercapitalized banks played an integral role
in the process, supported by financial advisors. CBN and AMCON helped them find
investors to ensure that all banks could recapitalize before the September 30, 2011,
deadline (Makanjuola 2016). During the recapitalization process leading up to the deadline,
all eight banks had negative equity and were kept as going concerns through the Tier II
capital injected by the CBN in 2009 (CBN 2011c). Banks that were unable to make sufficient
progress toward a deal became bridge banks, following a CBN meeting on June 13, 2011
(Makanjuola 2016). In the Nigerian context, a bridge bank is “a temporary full-service
government-owned bank licensed by the CBN but otherwise fully operated by the NDIC”
(Makanjuola 2016). The NDIC Act (2006, sec. 39) outlined the bridge bank resolution
process.
Wema Bank, which the CBN had supported in the initial recapitalization in 2009, was able
to avoid participating in the AMCON recapitalization. It recapitalized in 2010 with the help
of a ₦20 billion asset sale to AMCON and a ₦7.5 billion capital raise from private investors.
The CBN also waived ₦37 billion of Wema Bank’s original ₦87 billion loan; this appears to
be the only instance in which CBN waived a bank’s debt. Unlike the other banks, Wema
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continued to owe CBN a portion of its original loan, totaling ₦50 billion, at the end of 2011
(CBN 2011b). Wema Bank subsequently applied for a regional banking license. Under CBN
regulations, regional banks have lower capital requirements, which ensured Wema could
continue operating without further support (CBN 2010b; CBN 2011a).
Outcomes
In total, eight Nigerian banks were involved in AMCON’s recapitalization process in 2011.
Five banks were able to find acquirers and signed a TIA with their acquirers before the
deadline (Makanjuola 2016). To facilitate the deal, AMCON injected capital into each
institution to offset their negative equity—in other words, to adjust their net asset values
to zero prior to acquisition (Makanjuola 2016).
Three other banks failed to make satisfactory progress toward a recapitalization deal
before the deadline, and their banking licenses were revoked by the CBN. As a result, the
three failed banks had their assets and liabilities transferred to newly created bridge banks.
To ensure the new institutions were viable, AMCON provided a capital injection into each of
the banks—becoming their full owner and only shareholder (Makanjuola 2016). Figure 2
provides a summary of AMCON’s capital injections into these eight intervened banks.
Figure 2: Overview of AMCON Capital Injections
Bank

New Name

Intercontinental Bank

N/A

Union Bank Nigeria

Amount
[₦ billion]

2011 Acquirer

Final Acquirer

562

Access Bank

N/A

N/A

383

African Capital Alliance

N/A

Equitorial Trust Bank

N/A

65

Sterling Bank

N/A

Oceanic Bank

N/A

305

Ecobank Transnational

N/A

FinBank

N/A

155

First City Monument Bank

N/A

Bank PHB

Keystone

301

AMCON

Sigma Golf/Riverbank

Afribank

Mainstreet

426

AMCON

Skye Bank

Springbank

Enterprise

135

AMCON

Heritage Bank

Total

2,332

Source: AMCON 2012, 16.

Further, it was decided that AMCON’s capital injection would occur only after the licenses
of the failed banks had been revoked and new licenses for the bridge banks had been
issued. This setup ensured that “AMCON would not [acquire] anything directly from [failing
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institutions . . .] and [was] thus not susceptible to any action at the instance of shareholders
of the failing insured institutions” (Makanjuola 2016).
Overall, AMCON’s capital injections produced most of the agency’s reported losses from the
early years of its operations (AMCON 2012). When AMCON’s public accounts were issued
at the end of 2011, its first year of operations, the statements revealed a negative equity
position of ₦2.36 trillion (AMCON 2012). AMCON’s recapitalization efforts and subsequent
write-downs accounted for 88% of this total (AMCON 2012).
AMCON contributed a total of ₦1.47 trillion to bring the five intervened banks back to zero
NAV (AMCON 2012). By the end of 2011, AMCON had to write down 91.06% of the
investment, leaving it with ₦118 billion. Similarly, AMCON wrote down 88.49% of the
equity it acquired in the three bridge banks. As of December 31, 2011, AMCON reported a
combined NAV of ₦99 billion for the three banks. Its initial investment was ₦861 billion
(AMCON 2012). Figure 3 provides a detailed breakdown of the various injections and
write-downs.
Figure 3: Details of Write-Downs in Intervened and Bridge Banks

Source: AMCON 2012, 16.
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Key Design Decisions

1. Part of a Package: AMCON’s policy package included the acquisition of
nonperforming loans and the recapitalization of undercapitalized banks.
AMCON’s operations followed earlier interventions by the CBN intended to stabilize the
financial sector. These interventions included capital injections into nine banks totaling
₦667 billion in 2009 and a blanket guarantee for interbank lending until December 2011
(CBN 2010a). AMCON was set up in 2010 to provide additional support (Cerruti and
Neyens 2016). Out of nine banks that received support from the CBN in 2009, eight
benefited from AMCON’s capital injections. Wema Bank, which had converted to a regional
chapter, did not require additional support (CBN 2010b; CBN 2011a). AMCON’s mandate
was broad and encompassed both the role of a public AMC and a capital injection vehicle
(Cerruti and Neyens 2016). As an AMC, AMCON’s operations included the acquisition and
resolution of eligible banking sector assets, such as nonperforming loans or other
designated assets (Makanjuola 2016; see Ungersboeck and Runkel 2021).
2. Legal Authority: AMCON was established under the AMCON Act.
A first draft of the AMCON Act was forwarded to the Senate in November 2004 as a part of
the measures taken to strengthen the financial sector. At the time, the proposal
encountered strong pushback from opponents of the banking consolidation agenda and did
not gain the necessary traction. The idea was revived in 2009 following a special
examination of Nigerian banks, focusing policymakers’ attention on the fragility of the
domestic banking sector. A first public hearing on the bill was held at the House of
Representatives on January 28, 2010. After a second reading, the House enacted the bill on
March 10, 2010. The Nigerian Senate passed the bill on May 5, 2010. President Goodluck
Jonathan signed the AMCON Act into law on July 19, 2010 (Makanjuola 2016). Among other
functions,6 the AMCON Act empowered the agency to “purchase or invest in eligible
equities” (AMCON Act 2010, sec. 5).
AMCON was fully owned by the federal government, with its ₦10 billion paid-in capital split
evenly between the Ministry of Finance and the CBN (Makanjuola 2016). The cash helped
cover AMCON’s initial operating costs (Cerruti and Neyens 2016).

Other functions specified in the act included: acquire eligible bank assets, purchase or invest in eligible
equities, manage or dispose of eligible bank assets, issue and redeem bonds and debt securities for the
consideration of assets, and attempt to recognize maximum value on the resolution of acquired bank assets
(AMCON Act, sec. 5). Ungersboeck and Runkel (2021) discuss these powers in detail.
6
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3. Legal Authority: AMCON had the authority to transfer assets and liabilities of
banks that failed to qualify for the recapitalization program to a bridge bank
under the NDIC Act of 2006.
The AMCON Act provided the authority to allow AMCON to support the five intervened
banks in their acquisition deals by returning them to zero NAV (Makanjuola 2016).
However, the bridge bank solution implemented to rescue the remaining three failing
banks required the triggering of Sections 38(1; c) and 39 of the NDIC Act of 2006
(Makanjuola 2016). Section 38 (1; c) established the guidelines for the management and
restructuring of failing financial institutions and designated the NDIC, with the consultation
of the CBN, the ability to arrange the transfer of deposit liabilities by another insured
institution (NDIC Act 2006, sec. 38). Section 39 provided the NDIC the authority to
establish bridge banks (NDIC Act 2006, sec. 39).
4. Communication: The authorities’ communication strategy focused on ensuring a
smooth transition for the three failed banks that became bridge banks. The
communication strategy was implemented jointly by the NDIC and CBN.
The communication strategy during the intervention was primarily focused on removing
the uncertainty surrounding the transition of the three failed banks to AMCON-owned
bridge banks. The strategy was executed jointly by the NDIC and CBN (Makanjuola 2016).
The announcements were centered on August 6, 2011, the first day the bridge banks
operated as fully licensed banks (Makanjuola 2016). The communication strategy was laid
out in a report issued to the NDIC (Makanjuola 2016). The plan highlighted the importance
of a public announcement by the NDIC confirming that “it would continue to insure all
depositors migrating to the Bridge Banks” (Makanjuola 2016). At the same time, a press
statement by the CBN was planned to provide “a full faith solvency guarantee and credit
assurance for all bridge banks” (Makanjuola 2016). Finally, the communication plan
ensured more specific communication with “overseas regulators, foreign creditors [and]
rating agencies” (Makanjuola 2016).
5. Governance: AMCON was governed by a 10-member board of directors.
AMCON’s board of directors consisted of four executive directors and six nonexecutive
members (AMCON Act 2010, sec. 10). The Nigerian Senate approved the 10 nominees on
November 3, 2010. The board was led by Mustafa Chike-Obi as AMCON’s CEO (Makanjuola
2016). The CBN had considerable power over the board, as it nominated all four executive
directors, including the CEO, as well as two nonexecutive members, for a total of six
nominations (Makanjuola 2016). The Ministry of Finance nominated three nonexecutive
members, including the chairman of the board, while the last member was nominated by
the NDIC (Cerruti and Neyens 2016; Makanjuola 2016). All directors were nominated for
five-year terms with a possible reappointment to a second five-year term (Makanjuola
2016). The AMCON Act further specified that board members should have at least “10 years
[of] cognate financial experience at a senior management level, . . . have no conflict of
interest with AMCON’s business, and disclose debt obligations and interest” (AMCON Act
2010; Cerruti and Neyens 2016; Makanjuola 2016).
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6. Administration: Prior to the start of AMCON’s operations, the AMCON
Implementation Committee (AMCON-IC) devised a work plan for the
establishment of the agency.
The AMCON-IC met on six occasions between May and August 2010. As many as 30 people
attended meetings (Makanjuola 2016, 96, 100). During the first meeting, participants
included management consultants and legal and financial advisors from the Central Bank of
Nigeria, Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation, Deutsche Bank, Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc,
Chapel Hill Advisory Partners Limited, Olaniwun Ajayi LP, Kola Awodein & Company, and
PricewaterhouseCoopers. Subsequent meetings saw the addition of participants
representing various Nigerian and international institutions including the Ministry of
Finance, the Debt Management Office (DMO), the [Nigerian] Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Makanjuola 2016). The
work plan devised by the committee included, among other items, staff recruitment,
securing office locations, determining a valuation methodology for NPLs, and exploring
funding options for AMCON. The draft bill establishing AMCON was modeled after Ireland’s
National Asset Management Agency and Malaysia’s Danaharta. These agencies were
mandated to acquire NPLs during the GFC and the Asian Financial Crisis, respectively
(Makanjuola 2016).
7. Timing: The CBN set a deadline for recapitalization of September 30, 2011.
For the five banks that were able to sign a TIA before the September 30, 2011, deadline
imposed by the CBN, the injection occurred after an agreement with a potential acquirer
had been signed and shortly before the conclusion of the merger deal (Makanjuola 2016).
These injections were timed in such a manner that the intervened institutions had zero
NAVs at the time of the acquisitions. For the three banks that failed to find an acquirer and
did thus not make satisfactory progress toward a recapitalization before the deadline, the
injections occurred in early August 2011, as the banks’ boards of directors were taken over
by the NDIC and their assets and liabilities transferred to bridge banks (Makanjuola 2016).
8. Eligible Institutions: Eligible financial institutions included banks licensed by the
CBN to undertake the business of banking in Nigeria as well as banks or financial
institutions whose licenses had been revoked.
The definition of eligible financial institution (EFI) was provided in the guidelines issued to
AMCON by the CBN and included banks licensed by the CBN to undertake the business of
banking in Nigeria as well as banks or financial institutions whose licenses had been
revoked (AMCON Guidelines No. 1 2010). The guidelines focus on AMCON’s role as an asset
management corporation. While participation in the asset acquisition program was
strongly incentivized under the guidelines, participation in the capital injection program
was dictated by a bank’s ability to achieve the 10% CAR position required by the CBN
deadline (AMCON Guidelines No. 1, 7). Sixteen of the 24 EFIs were sufficiently capitalized,
five banks were undercapitalized but able to arrange an acquisition, and three banks were
undercapitalized and had to be acquired by AMCON.
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9. Size: AMCON based its total ₦2.3 trillion size on each institution’s capital
position.
In total, AMCON injected ₦2.3 trillion into eight banks (AMCON 2012). This sum was
determined by calculating how much debt each bank would need to reach a net asset value
of zero (Makanjuola 2016, tables 6.4 and 6.7).
10. Source of Funding: Funding for the operations was provided through the Banking
Sector Resolution Cost Fund (RCF) and AMCON-issued, government-guaranteed,
zero-coupon bonds.
The RCF was a ₦1.5 trillion sinking fund financed through contributions by Nigerian
financial institutions and the Central Bank of Nigeria. It was intended to fund AMCON’s loan
acquisition and recapitalization activities (Makanjuola 2016).
The bonds were issued in five series between December 31, 2010, and December 28, 2011.
Figure 4 depicts AMCON’s bond issuances. While AMCON managed to retire about onethird of its bonds by 2014, the remainder was refinanced by the CBN. The arrangement
provided that the CBN invested ₦3.6 trillion in AMCON bonds in order to refinance the
agency’s exposure (Mazen 2013). The bonds were guaranteed by the Nigerian government
and qualified as eligible investments for the CBN and pension funds. They could also be
traded on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (AMCON 2012). To address their liquidity needs,
banks used the bonds to access the CBN discount window, where the bonds served as
collateral (CBN 2015).
Figure 4: A Breakdown of AMCON Bond Issuances

Source: AMCON 2012, 33.
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In 2015, the CBN reported that “AMCON redeemed the Series 1, 2, 3 and 4 Bonds […] held
by banks, valued at ₦1.04 trillion, [using its] internally-generated funds and the
outstanding balance in the Banking Sector Resolution Cost Sinking Fund.” A further ₦3.8
trillion of bonds held by the CBN were restructured into a 10-year bond with a 6% coupon
(CBN 2015).
11. Individual Participation Limits: Each bank’s net asset value dictated the amount
to be injected.
Makanjuola (2016) explains that bidders would not invest in a bank with a negative net
asset value. Therefore, AMCON injected bonds sufficient to increase a bank’s NAV to zero
(Makanjuola 2016, tables 6.4 and 6.7). As such, the amount required to float a bank’s NAV
acted both as an upper and lower bound on the size of AMCON’s injections.
12. Capital Characteristics: AMCON received ordinary common shares in return for
the zero-coupon bonds.
The equity issued to AMCON in consideration for the zero-coupon bonds was ordinary
common shares. In the case of the acquisition of Oceanic Bank by Ecobank Transnational
Inc. (ETI), AMCON and Oceanic Bank legacy shareholders received ETI shares in
consideration for their equity in Oceanic. After Oceanic was acquired by ETI, AMCON and
Oceanic’s other shareholders were issued ordinary shares with total value of ₦38.5 billion
and preference shares with value of ₦16.5 billion.
13. Dividends and Pricing: Banks were recapitalized with negative equity, so shares
paid no dividends.
Makanjuola (2016) writes that the five intervened banks had zero intrinsic value, which
meant that shares were priced at ₦0. Due to the (lack of) value, dividends were also not
paid.
14. Allocation of Losses for Existing Stakeholders: All legacy shareholders of the five
intervened banks became shareholders of the merged entity. Legacy
shareholders of the bridge banks were wiped out.
In the case of the five intervened banks, shareholders received new equity in the merged
entity. They experienced losses only to the extent that their shares were diluted following
AMCON’s injections and the bank’s acquisition by a third party. The impact on shareholder
value varied for each case. Details on the value of stock held by legacy shareholders are
unavailable. Shareholders of the failed banks that were resolved through the bridge bank
solution were wiped out as the banks were fully acquired by AMCON. In each case, AMCON
fully absorbed the bank’s negative equity.

512

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 3 Iss. 3

15. Fate of Existing Board and Management: AMCON did not replace management of
any banks.
The authorities did not further intervene in the management of the five banks that were
able to find an acquirer (Makanjuola 2016). The boards of the failing banks were replaced
and overseen by the NDIC.
16. Other Conditions: Documents surveyed do not suggest that banks were subject to
other conditions of AMCON’s capital injections.
No documents suggest other conditions to which banks were subject as a result of
AMCON’s capital injections.
17. Exit Strategy: AMCON did not have an explicit exit strategy.
The IMF has criticized AMCON for its lack of an explicit exit strategy. The Fund recognized
the agency’s contribution in restoring stability in the banking sector. However, it voiced
concerns regarding the absence of a sunset provision for AMCON’s activities. In a 2013
report, the Fund recommends that a “credible exit strategy [should be] devised to ensure a
smooth winding up of its operations by end-2017” (IMF 2013). An explicit sunset date is
considered “important to minimize fiscal risks and avoid potential moral hazard behavior
by the banks” (IMF 2013). The Fund reiterates its criticism in a 2019 report, stating that
“an exit strategy for the state-backed asset management company (AMCON) is urgently
needed.” The Fund recommends “that AMCON stops the purchase of distressed assets,
formally sets a sunset to its existence, earmarks its cash flows to buy back bonds, sets
annual disposal targets, implements a plan to divest AMCON’s interests in companies and
banks, improves its legal power to recover assets and is gradually phased out” (IMF 2019).
18. Amendments to Relevant Regulation: The AMCON Act’s two amendments were
unrelated to its capital injections.
The AMCON Act was amended in 2015 and 2019. These amendments were meant to extend
AMCON’s power as a debt restructuring and collection agency. They were focused on
facilitating AMCON’s exit strategy related to its loan acquisition activities. The legal
framework related to its role as a recapitalization vehicle remained unchanged (AMCON
Amendment Act 2015; Berkeley Legal 2019).

III. Evaluation
AMCON’s capital injections achieved their goal of protecting depositors and ensuring that
failing banks were not wound down (Makanjuola 2016). Critics focused on AMCON’s
governance and lack of independence from the CBN, and lack of transparency. In 2013, two
years after the recapitalizations, the CBN took over AMCON’s debts, leaving it to the central
bank and potentially taxpayers to bear losses. Moreover, the government did not disclose
how much of those losses taxpayers ultimately realized (Cerruti and Neyens, 120).
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On the operational side, criticism focused on the guidelines issued by the CBN. Critics
raised concerns regarding the central bank’s decision to limit the scope of AMCON’s
activities to deposit money banks. In particular, the exclusion of the microfinance sector
“question[ed] the CBN’s claim that its intervention was [intended] to protect depositors
and creditors and prevent losses” (Osuji 2012). The CBN’s influence also reflected on
AMCON’s governance. Beyond serving as the agency’s main supervisory authority and
shareholder, the central bank nominated all four executive members of the board of
directors, including the chief executive. Given that experience shows independence to be an
important factor in an AMC’s success, critics raised the question whether “these powers […]
[compromised] its mission of attaining financial stability” (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). The
issues related to AMCON’s independence were further exacerbated due to concerns
regarding AMCON’s ability to conduct its operations. One source noted that “AMCON
apparently lack[ed] persons with specialist skills including credit and transaction risk
management” (Osuji 2012). On AMCON’s independence the source observed that “AMCON’s
board lack[ed] sufficient suggestions of independence to withstand political and other
pressures” and “AMCON [was] practically an arm of the CBN” (Osuji 2012).
The IMF criticized AMCON for its lack of an explicit exit strategy. The IMF recognized the
agency’s contribution in restoring stability in the banking sector. However, it voiced
concerns regarding the absence of a sunset provision for AMCON’s activities. In a 2013
report, the Fund recommended that a “credible exit strategy [should be] devised to ensure
a smooth winding up of its operations by end-2017” (IMF 2013). The IMF considered an
explicit sunset date “important to minimize fiscal risks and avoid potential moral hazard
behavior by the banks” (IMF 2013). It reiterated its criticism in a 2019 report, stating that
“an exit strategy for the state-backed asset management company (AMCON) is urgently
needed.” The Fund recommended “that AMCON stops the purchase of distressed assets,
formally sets a sunset to its existence, earmarks its cash flows to buy back bonds, sets
annual disposal targets, implements a plan to divest AMCON’s interests in companies and
banks, improves its legal power to recover assets and is gradually phased out” (IMF 2019).
Finally, there were concerns regarding the manner in which AMCON absorbed losses from
its loan purchases and bank recapitalization activities and the eventual allocation of those
losses. A World Bank study noted that the program restored banks’ capital, but “the
negative equity losses were transferred into the AMC with no expectation of recovery,
rather than being allocated to banks’ shareholders, depositors, and creditors” (Cerruti and
Neyens 2016). By the end of 2014, AMCON’s accounts showed a negative equity position of
₦3.6 trillion due to its loss absorption program (AMCON 2012; Cerruti and Neyens 2016).
The resulting debt “was initially designed to be paid first from the proceeds of asset sales,
with any remaining balance to be repaid out of the Banking Sector Resolution Cost Fund”
(Cerruti and Neyens 2016). In 2015, AMCON announced that it had recovered 57% of its
eligible asset portfolio for a total of ₦1 trillion in recovered funds (Osae-Brown 2019;
Wallace 2015). However, it maintained a large amount of NPLs on its balance sheet, and
further losses accumulated from its bank recapitalization operations. Exact information on
the return on the equity held in the five intervened banks is unavailable. The exit deals for
the bridge banks yielded a return far below AMCON’s initial investment. Given the ₦1.5
trillion ceiling on the RCF, it appeared that a large share of the losses would eventually be
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transferred to the government (Makanjuola 2016). “Repayment of the recapitalization
costs is now a matter for the CBN and potentially a fiscal issue” (Cerruti and Neyens 2016).

IV.
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